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In  recent  years,  a substantial  research  effort  has  focused  on  estimating  the  contribution  of public 
infrastructure  capital  to  the  productivity  of private  factors  of production  and  to  economic  growth. 
This  research  initiative  appears  to  have  sprung  Tom  the  recognition  of  two  facts  about  public 
infrastructure  spending  in  the  United  States.  First,  public  nonmilitary  capital  accumulation, 
expressed  as a percentage  of  output  or of  the  government  budget,  peaked  in the  latter  half  of  the 
1960’s  and,  as  a result,  has  been  seen  as a potential  explanatory  force  in  the  productivity  growth 
slowdown  of  1970’s  and  1980’s.  Second,  over  the past  few  decades  the  United  States  has  devoted 
a smaller  share  of gross  domestic  product  to public  infktructure  than  other  industrialized  countries, 
which  has  led  to  the  possibility  that  public  capital  might  partly  explain  the  relatively  low  rate  of 
productivity  growth  in the  United  States  vis-a-vk  other  countries  such  as Japan  and  Germany. 
The  early  empirical  work  in this  area,  conducted  largely  at the  aggregate  level,  indicated  quite  high 
returns  to public  capital  investment  and  led  some  researchers  to  strong  conclusions  about  the  role 
of public  capital  in the productivity  slowdown.  For  instance,  Munnell(l99Oa)  boldly  stated  that  “the 
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drop  in  labor  productivity  [sic]  has  not  been  due  to  some  mystical  concept  of  multifactor 
productivity  or  technical  progress.  Rather,  it has  been  due  to  a decline  in  the  growth  of  public 
infrastructure.” 
As it now  stands,  the  literature  contains  a relatively  wide  range  of estimates,  with  a mar*tial  product 
of  public  capital  which  is well  in  excess  of  that  of private  capital  (e.g.,  Aschauer  (1989),  Femald 
(1992),  and  Kocherlakota  and  Yi  (1996)),  approximately  equal  to  that  of  private  capital  (e.g., 
Munnell  (1990b)),  well  below  that  of private  capital  (e.g.,  Eberts  (1986)  and  Holtz-Eakin  (1994)) 
and,  in a couple  of  instances,  even  negative  (e.&.,  c  Evans  and  Karras  (1994)  and  Hulten  and  Schwab 
(199 1)).  Some  economists  argue  that  the wide  range  of estimates  render  the  results  useless  from  the 
policy  perspective  (Aaron  (1991)).  Others  point  to a list of potential  statistical  problems--a  reverse 
causation  from  productivity  to public  capital,  a spurious  correlation  due  to nonstationarity  and/or  to 
the omission  of relevant  variables--to  argue  that the  empiricaI  results  are built  on  “fragile  statistical 
foundations”  and  should  be viewed  with  extreme  skepticism  (Jorgenson  (1991)).  A few  economists 
go to the  extreme  and  conclude  that  “there  is no statistically  significant  relationship  between  public 
capital  and  private  output”  (Tatom  (1993)). 
Still, some  economists  involved  in the debate  about  the macroeconomic  effects  of public  capital  have 
been  convinced  enough  by  the  empirical  results  to  assert  that  an  increase  in  public  investment 
spending  can  be  safely  expected  to  raise  economic  growth.  Yet  the  finding  that  public  capital  is 
productive,  even  if valid,  is not  sufficient  to  ensure  that  boosting  public  investment  spending  will 
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stimulate  long  term  growth.’  At  least  three  considerations  must  be  addressed.  First,  there  is the 
question  of  whether  a permanent  increase  in public  investment  induces  a permanent,  or  merely  a 
temporary,  increase  in economic  growth.  The  traditional  neoclassical  growth  model  of Solow  (1956) 
predicts  that  any  positive  effect  of  an  increase  in  the  national  savings  and  investment  rate  on 
economic  growth  will  be transitory;  the  steady-state  growth  rate  is fully  determined  by population 
growth  and  exogenous  technological  progress.  In the  neoclassical  setting,  an  increase  in  spending 
on  productive  public  capital  will  induce  a period  of  temporarily  high  investment,  but  the  pace  of 
capital  accumulation,  and  of  economic  growth,  will  slow  over  time  as the  accumulation  of capital 
diminishes  the  return  to capital  and  the  incentive  for  further  investment.  In  the  long  run,  the  level 
of  output  will  be  higher  but  the  growth  rate  of  output  will  return  to  the  same  level  as  before  the 
public  spending  initiative. 
Second,  the  effect  of an increase  in public  investment  on economic  growth  is likely  to depend  on the 
relative  marginal  productivity  of private  versus  public  capital.  In the neoclassical  setting,  an increase 
in public  investment  (at the  expense  of private  investment)  will  raise  or lower  the  economic  growth 
rate  depending  on  whether  the  marginal  product  of  public  capital  exceeds,  or,  respectively,  is 
exceeded  by the  marginal  product  of private  capital.?  This  consideration  validates  the  concerns  of 
Aaron  and  others  that  the  range  of empirical  estimates  of the  output  elasticity  of public  capital  is too 
large  to be  informative  to the  public  policy  process;  we need  to know,  rather  precisely,  not  only  that 
public  capital  isproductive  but  that  it is su@kientlyproductive  to be confident  of  a beneficial  effect 
of  increased  public  investment  on  economic  growth. 
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Third,  the  effect  of public  investment  on growth  is likely  to depend  on  how  the  increased  spending 
is financed.  Empirical  studies  such  as Engen  and  Skinner  (1996)  find  evidence  that  increases  in tax 
rates reduce  the rate of economic  growth.  Thus,  it is to be expected  that  an increase  in public  capital- 
-which,  in most  cases,  will  require  a corresponding  increase  in tax  rates--will  stimulate  economic 
growth  onIy  if the  productivity  impact  of public  capital  exceeds  the  adverse  tax  impact. 
This  paper  focuses  on  some  of these  considerations  by  investigating  the relationship  between  public 
capital,  productivity,  and  economic  growth  in an endogenous  growth  setting.  The  next  section  of 
the  paper  lays  out  a simple  model  of  an economy  with  productive  public  capital.  The  subsequent 
section  reports  on  empirical  results  linking  the  ratio  of public  and  private  capital  to productivity 
growth.  The  fmal  section  concludes  by  suggesting  directions  for  future  research. 
II. A Model  of Productive  Public  Capital  and  Economic  Growth 
As  is  typical  in  recent  work  in  economic  growth,  we  begin  with  a  consumer/producer  who 
maximizes  a constant  intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution  utility  function  over  an infinite  planning 
horizon  as given  by 
w 
c1-o_l 
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where  c represents  consumption,  -0  the  constant  elasticity  of  the  marginal  utility  of consumption, 
and  p the  rate  of time  preference.  3 The  agent  has  access  to a Cobb-Douglas  production  function 
a,  +  c&  =  1  (2) 
where  y is output,  k is a broad  measure  of private  capital  (inclusive  of tangibIe  and  human  capital), 
and kg is public  infi-astructure  capital.’  All  variables  are expressed  in per  worker  terms.  Thus,  the 
production  function  exhibits  constant  returns  to scale across  the private  and public  capital  inputs,  but 
increasing  returns  to scale  across  raw  labor  and  capital.  The  model  ignores  technological  progress, 
population  growth,  and  depreciation  of private  or public  capital  in order  to bring  out  the  essential 
points  in the  clearest  manner. 
The  government  purchases  and  maintains  the  stock  of public  capital  which  enters  as an input  to the 
private  sector  production  function  (2).  At  an  initial  point  in  time,  the  government  is viewed  as 
choosing  a particular  level  of public  capital,  go.  The  initial  purchase  of government  sector  capital 
is assumed  to be fmanced  by the  sale of perpetuities  at a coupon  rate  of r percent.  Subsequently,  the 
government  is taken  to  maintain  a particular  ratio  of public  to private  capital 
(3) 
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k;:  = y-kg  (4) 
where  y  is the  rate  of  growth  of the  private  capital  stock. 
It  is assumed  that  the  government  levies  a tax  on  private  production  at rate  0  for  the  purpose  of 
&an&g  (i) the on-going  public  expenditure  needed  to maintain  the public  capital  stock  ratio  against 
growth  in  the  private  capital  stock  and  (ii)  the  interest  payments  on  the  initial  stock  of  debt. 
Accordingly,  the  government  budget  constraint  is 
OD  ca 
kg,  + s 
ki  e -“dt  = s 
0-y  e -Hdt. 
0  0 
Given  steady  state  growth  at the  rate  y,  the government  budget  constraint  reduces  to5 
r-kg0  =  e-y,. 
(5) 
(6) 
The  agent  maximizes  utility  as given  in equation  (1) taking  the  public  capital  stock  and  the  tax  rate 
as beyond  his  influence.  The  maximization  of  utility  is subject  to  a standard  resource  constraint 
which  determines  the  level  of  private  capital  accumulation  as  the  difference  between  after-tax 
income  from  production  and  private  consumption6 
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R = (l-e)kakkga~  -  c.  (7) 
In this  environment,  the  steady  state  equilibrium  involves  a common  growth  rate  of consumption, 
public  and  private  capital,  and  per  worker  output  given  by 
y  =  -)(l  -@(l  -cQakg -  p].  (8) 
Evidently,  the  common  growth  rate  of consumption,  capital,  and  output  depends  positively  on  the 
ratio  of public  to private  capital  and  negatively  on  the  tax rate.  In order  to  determine  the  net  effect 
of  government  capital  accumulation  on  economic  growth,  it is necessary  to  eliminate  the  tax  rate 
from  the  growth  rate  expression  in equation  (8). 
This  elimination  of  the  tax  rate  is  accomplished  in  the  following  manner.  First,  note  that  in 
equilibrium  the government’s  maintenance  of a particular  ratio  of public  to private  capital,  a,  implies 
that  private  sector  output  may  be  written  as 
As a further  equilibrium  condition,  the  agent  must  be willing  to hold  the  available  stocks  of debt  and 
private  capital.  Consequently,  the  interest  rate on government  perpetuities  must  equal  the  net  of tax 
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return  to private  capital,  so that 
r  =  (1 -@(l  -aJ~=~. 
The  steady  state  budget  constraint  in  equation  (6)  and  the  level  of  output  in equation  (9)  may  be 
solved  for  the  tax  rate  as a function  of the  interest  rate  on public  debt  and  the  public  capital  stock 
ratio 
(11) 
which,  after  substituting  into  equation  (10)  allows  us to  obtain  the  steady  state  equilibrium  interest 
rate  as 
Finally,  from  equations  (8) and  (12) we get  the  solution  for the  growth  rate  of per  worker  output  as 
a function  of the  public  capital  ratio: 
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(13) 
Figure  1 traces  out  the  relationship  between  the  growth  rate,  y,  and  the  ratio  of  public  to private 
capital,  4,  for an output  elasticity  of public  capital  equal  to 0.2.  The  growth  rate  initially  rises  with 
the ratio  of public  to private  capital,  reaches  a maximum,  and then  falls  toward  zero.  The  intuition, 
similar  to that described  for flow  government  spending  in Barro  (1990),  is straightforward.  Consider 
an increase  in @ induced  by  a marginal  increase  in the public  capital  stock.  For  a given  tax  rate,  the 
increase  in the  ratio  of public  to private  capital  increases  the  after-  tax  marginal  product  of  capital 
in  the  amount’ 
(14) 
where  mpk represents  the  marginal  product  of  private  capital.  Taken  alone,  this  increase  in  the 
marginal  product  of  capital  would  be  conducive  to  growth.  However,  the  increase  in  the  public 
capital  stock  also  requires  a rise  in the tax rate  which,  in turn,  reduces  the  after-tax  return  to capital 
in the  amount 
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This  decrease  in the  after-tax  marginal  product  of capital,  when  taken  by  itself,  would  deter  growth. 
At low  levels  of 4,  the productivity  effect  in equation  (14) dominates  the  tax  rate  effect  in  equation 
( 15), and the  after-tax  marginal  product  of capital  rises.  This  rise in the  return  to investment,  in turn, 
stimulates  private  capital  accumulation  and  raises  the growth  rate.  But  at sufficiently  high  levels  of 
4,  the tax effect  overwhelms  the productivity  effect,  the after-tax  return  to  capital  is depressed,  and 
private  investment  and  the  growth  rate  decline.’ 
Specifically,  the  growth  rate  rises  with  the  ratio  of public  to private  capital  from  a minimum  of  ymin 
= -p/a  to reach  a maximum  of 
(16) 
Equations  (14) and  (15) can be used  to show  that the maximal  growth  rate of per worker  output,  y”“, 
corresponds  to  a ratio  of public  to private  capital  given  by 
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@  -  cl&  max  _ 
(I -‘kg)’  ’ 
(17) 
When  the tax rate  function  (14)  is evaluated  at the ratio  of public  to private  capital  which  maximizes 
the economic  growth  rate,  @““, we obtain  the result  that the tax rate should  be set equal  to the  output 
elasticity  of government  capital,  or 
8 
max  _ 
-  ‘kg’  (18) 
Combining  equations  (17) and  (18) then  yields  the result  that the economic  growth  rate  is maximized 
when  the  government  chooses  a ratio  of public  to private  capital  so as equate  the  aJim--tax marginal 
product  of private  capital  to the  marginal  product  of public  capital: 
(l -e>mpk  = “pg  (1% 
where  VIP, denotes  the  marginal  product  of input  x (x = k, kg) and we  have  used  the  fact  that  for  the 
Cobb-Douglas  specification  of  the  production  function  the  output  elasticities  of private  and  public 
capital  are equal  to  ak and  4F  respectively. 
Thus,  the model  of this  section  implies  that  there  is a non-linear  relationship  between  public  capital 
and  economic  growth  such  that permanent  increases  in the public  capital  ratio  bring  forth  permanent 
increases  in growth--but  only  if the marginal  product  of public  capital  exceeds  the  after-tax  marginal 
11 Do States  Owimize?  Public  CaDital  and  Economic Growth 
product  of  private  capital.  It  may  be  important  to  take  into  account  this  predicted  non-linearity 
between  public  capital  and  growth  when  performing  empirical  work.  Consider,  for example,  Figure 
2.  This  figure  shows  hypothetical  data  on  economic  growth,  ranging  from  2.0  to  3.5  percent  per 
annum,  and  the  ratio  of public  capital  to private  capital,  running  from  0.0  to  1.0. The  former  data 
series  was  produced  using  a random  number  generator  to obtain  a random  term,  r-l, along  with  the 
formula  (representing  a stochastic  version  of the theoretical  model  and equation  (13)  with  parameter 
values  clkg= 0.2  and  p = 0) 
y  =  (.05)-(  @’  i-+)+rl=W+tl*  (20) 
By  construction,  these  hypothetical  data  contain  a strong  relationship  between  economic  growth, 
y,  and  suitably  transformed  public  capital,  f;  an  OLS  regression  of  y onf  yields  a coefficient 
estimate  of  0.0499  with  an  associated  standard  error  of  0.0002  and  has  an  adjusted  coefficient  of 
determination  of 0.6474.  Yet,  as the  figure  indicates,  these  hypothetical  data  contain  no  statistical 
relationship  between  economic  growth  and  untransfomed  public  capital;  an OLS  regression  of y on 
+ gives  a coefficient  estimate  of  0.0004  with  an  associated  standard  error  of  0.0008  and  has  an 
adjusted  coefficient  of  determination  of  -0.0072.  Consequently,  it can  be  seen  that  a simple  non- 
linear  regression  of  economic  growth  on public  capital  may  convey  the  incorrect  impression  that 
public  capital  is unproductive  and is incapable  of affecting  growth  when,  in fact, it is productive  and- 
-at least  for  a good  portion  of the  sample--is  capable  of  stimulating  growth. 
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III.  Empirical  Evidence  on  Productive  Public  Capital  and  Economic  Growth 
This  section  contains  an  empirical  investigation  of  the  relationship  between  public  capital  and 
economic  growth  using  data  for the  48 contiguous  United  States  during  the decades  of the  1970s  and 
1980s.  Table  1 provides  descriptive  statistics  on the variables  used  in this  study.  Economic  growth 
[y] is measured  as average  annual  growth  in real gross  state product  per  employed  person;  the  basic 
data  on current  dollar  gross  state product  were  obtained  from  various  issues  of the Survey  of&went 
Business  (Renshaw,  Trott,  and  Friedenberg  (1988);  Beemiller  and  Dunbar  (1993))  and  were  placed 
in constant  (I 982)  dollar,  per  worker  terms  using  the  deflator  for gross  domestic  product  from  the 
Survey  of  Current  Business  (U.S.  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  (annual))  and  non-agricultural 
employment  from  Employment,  Hours,  and Earnings,  State Areas  (U.S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics 
(annual)).  As  measured,  economic  growth  ranged  from  a  high  of  3.1  percent  per  year 
(Massachusetts  in the  1980s)  to a low  of  -2.6 percent  per year  (Wyoming  in the  1980s).  The  initial 
level  of  output  per  worker  [y]  is  represented  as  the  logarithm  of  real  gross  state  product  per 
employed  person  in  1970  and  1980, respectively,  and also  was  obtained  from  the  above-mentioned 
sources.  The  public  capital  variable  [kg/k]  is measured  as the ratio  of public  capital  to private  capital 
(both  in  constant  (1982)  dollars)  and  was  constructed  using  data  from  Munnell  (1990b).  This 
variable  is expressed  in initial  year  (1970,  1980) values  in order  to  eliminate,  or  at least  minimize, 
a potential  endogeneity  of  the  public  capital  stock.  On average  over  the  48  states  and  the  decades 
of  the  1970’s  and  1980’s,  the  public  capital  stock  was  44.6  percent  as  large  as the  private  capital 
stock,  and  took  on  a minimum  value  of  19.4 percent  (Wyoming  in  1980)  and  a maximum  value  of 
79.3 percent  (Rhode  Island  in  1970).  The  flow  government  spending  variable  [gnC] is measured  as 
13 Table  1 
Descriptive  Statistics 
I  Mean  I  Maximum  I  Minimum  Standard Deviation 
.Oll 
I  Y  I  10.416  I  11.201  I  10.121  7  .176 
k@  446  .793  -194  .136 
ti  .139  .293  .049  .049 
kg(core)/k  .267  .522  .128  .075 
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the  ratio  of total  general  government  expenditure  to private  capital  (both  in constant  (1982)  dollars), 
with  the  former  variable  being  obtained  from  Governmental  Finances  (U.S.  Bureau  of the  Census 
(annual)).  This  variable  averaged  13.9 percent  and ran from  a low of 4.9 percent  (Wyoming  in 1970) 
up to a high  of 29.3  percent  (New  York  in  1970).  The  core  public  capital  ratio  &g(core)/k],  which 
is  expressed  as the  ratio  of highway  and  water  and  sewer  capital  to private  capital,  averaged  26.7 
percent  and  attained  a minimum  of  12.8 percent  (Louisiana  in  1970) and  a maximum  of 52.2 percent 
(Rhode  Island  in  1970).  Finally,  the  other  public  capital  variable  [kg(other)/k],  measured  as total 
public  capital  minus  core  public  capital  as a ratio  to private  capital,  reached  a low  of  4.7  percent 
(Wyoming  in  1980),  a high  of 45.1  percent  (New  York  in  1970), and  averaged  17.9 percent  over  the 
entire  sample. 
A.  Growth  and  Government  Capital:  Linear  Impact 
We  begin  the  empirical  analysis  by  considering  the  regression  equation 
y,,  =  a + b-a,,  +c’z,,  +  E,  (21) 
where  a,  6, and  c are coefftcients  to be  estimated,  0 = kg/k,  z represents  control  variables  such  as 
the  logarithm  of  initial  output  per  worker  and  the  unemployment  rate,  i refers  to  individual  states, 
and  t refers  to particular  decades.  Table  A. 1 indicates  a rather  sizeable  and  statistically  significant 
relationship  between  the  public  capital  ratio  and  economic  growth,  with  a coefficient  estimate  for 
kg/k  ranging  between  0.020  and  0.041.  These  estimates  suggest  that  a one  standard  deviation 
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increase  in the  public  capital  ratio--say  from  its average  value  of  0.446  to  0.582--would  induce  a 
contemporaneous  0.27  to 0.54  standard  deviation  increase  in economic  growth  of between  0.003  and 
0.006  percentage  points  per  year.  Table  A.1  also  indicates  a strong  convergence  of  output  per 
worker  across  states,  with  a coefficient  estimate  on the  logarithm  of  initial  year  output  per  worker 
of -0.034  or -0.035.  This  result  suggests  that  an increase  in public  capital  will  have  transitory,  but 
not permanent,  effects  on  economic  growth.  Nevertheless,  there  would  be  a significant  effect  on the 
level  of output;  the  same  one  standard  deviation  increase  in the  public  capital  ratio  would  cumulate 
to a 8.4 percent  increase  in output  per worker  in the long  run9  Finally,  the regressions  in the  last two 
columns  of the  table  allow  for  an influence  of the unemployment  rate  [u] on  economic  growth.  One 
might  suspect  that  the  inclusion  of the  unemployment  rate  would  help  to  ensure  that  the  regression 
of economic  growth  on public  capital  would  be picking  up  long-run  (or  secular)  effects  rather  than 
short-run  (or  cyclical)  effects,  in  which  case  the  estimated  coefftcient  on  the  unemployment  rate 
would  be expected  to be positive.  Specifically,  the  rate  of growth  as the  economy  emerges  from  a 
recession  (and  its associated  high  level  of unemployment)  can be expected  to be higher  than  growth 
on  the  normal  transition  path  to  the  steady  state.  While  the  unemployment  rate  carries  the 
appropriate  positive  sign  in these  regressions  to substantiate  this  argument,  the  effect  is quantiatively 
small  and  statistically  weak. 
Table  A.2  allows  for  a separate  effect  of the  decade  of the  1970s on the  rate  of economic  growth  by 
adding  a dummy  variable  [d70s]  to  the  regression  equation.  As  might  have  been  expected,  the 
average  rate of growth--conditional  on the public  capital  ratio,  the  initial  level  of ouptut  per  worker, 
15 Table  A.2 
Growth  and  Government  Capital 
OLS  Regressions  with  Time  Effect 
+  .045  .026  .045  .026 
(.007,  .OOS)  (.006,  .006)  (.007,  .008)  (.006,  .006) 
Y  -.033  -.033 
(.004,  .OOS)  (.004,  .W5) 
U  c  .OOl  <  .OOl 
(.OOl,  ml)  (.OOl,  < .OOl) 
d70s  -.008  -.007  -.007  -.006 
(.002,  .002)  (.OOl. .OOl)  (.002,  .002)  (.002,  .002) 
R?  .370  .599  .485  .597 
SER  8.549  6.825  8.587  6.84  1 
(x10.‘) 
LL  322.447  344.586  322.548  344.886 
Notes:  See  Table  A. 1. Do States  Optimize?  Public  Capital  and  Economic  Growth 
and  the  unemployment  rate--was  significantly  lower  during  the  1970s  than  the  198Os, in the  range 
of  0.006  to  0.008  percentage  points  per  year.  Nevertheless,  the  introduction  of  the  time  period 
dummy  has  only  a minor  impact  on  the  estimated  coefficients  (and  associated  standard  errors)  of 
either  the  public  capital  ratio  or the  inital  level  of output  per  worker. 
Table  A.3  introduces  separate  fixed  effects  for the  individual  states  in the  sample  and,  in doing  so, 
communicates  a far different  message  for the  role of public  capital  in determining  economic  growth 
rates.  While  the  sign  and  magnitude  of the  impact  of public  capital  on growth  remains  in the  same 
neighborhood  as the  previous  estimates--between  0.03 1 and  0.039--the  associated  standard  errors 
increase  by  a factor  of 5 or 6 which,  in turn,  renders  the  relationship  statistically  insignicant.  Thus 
the  previous  finding  of  a significant  role  for  public  capital--at  least  in this  linear  form--cannot  be 
taken  as robust  to estimation  methods. 
A similar  message  is conveyed  for the  role  of the  initial  level  of per worker  output.  In this  case,  the 
estimated  coefficients  become  somewhat  smaller  in magnitude--in  absolute  terms,  between  0.0 18 
and  0.02%-and  also  are rendered  statistically  insignificant.  This  is a result  of  independent  interest, 
as it implies  a  lack  of convergence  in productivity  levels  across  states  economies--a  finding  in sharp 
contrast  to  other  empirical  studies  of  state  economic  growth  (such  as  Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin 
(1991)).  Presumably,  the  difference  in  results  is  due  to  the  inclusion  (in  the  present  case)  and 
exclusion  (as in Barro  and  &la-i-Martin  (199 1)) of individual  state  effects. 
16 Table  A.3 
Growth  and Government  Capital 
Fixed Effect  Regressions 
.039  .034  .038 
(.032,  .033)  (.033,  .034)  (.033,  .034) 
-.018 
(.027, .024) 
U  c .OOl 
(.OOl,  .OOl) 
d70s  -.008  -.007  -.007 
(.002,  .002)  (.002, .002)  (.003,  .003) 
R’  .410  .402  .398 
SER  8.279  8.329  8.360 
(xlo-3) 
LL  359.322  359.800  359.440 
Notes:  See  Table  A. 1. 
.03 1  I 
.396 
8.375 
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B.  Growth  and  Government  Capitai:  Non-linear  Impact 
We  next  consider  equations  of  the  general  form 
y,,  =  a  +  b-f;,  + GZ,~ +  ai,  (22) 
where  the  variablefdenotes  transformed  public  capital  as given  by 
(23) 
and,  as  before,  z represents  other  explanatory  variables.  Table  B.l  contains  OLS  regressions  of 
economic  growth  on  transformed  public  capital  under  the  maintained  assumption  that  the  output 
elasticity  of public  capital  equals  0.30--an  elasticity  estimate  lying  between  that  of Aschauer  (1989) 
at 0.39  and  that  of Munnell(1990b)  at 0.15.”  As with  the  estimates  in Table  A. 1, there  is a strong 
positive  effect  of  public  capital  on  the  growth  rate  of  output  per  worker;  there  is  evidence  of 
convergence  effects  across  state  economies;  and there  is little  substantive  role  for the  unemployment 
rate.  Comparing  the  adjusted  coefficients  of determination  of  the  analogous  equations  in the  two 
tables  (A.1  and  B.l)  indicates  no  clear  preference  for  the  linear  or  non-linear  version  of  the 
relationship;  for  instance,  the  estimates  contained  in  the  first  column  of  each  table  suggest  a 
preference  for  the  non-linear  version,  while  the  estimates  contained  in  the  fourth  column  of  each 
table  indicate  a preference  for  the  linear  version. 
Table  B.2  , like  Table  A-2,  introduces  a separate  time  effect  for the  growth  experience  of the  1970s. 
17 Table B.l 
Growth  and Government  Capital 
OLS  Regressions 
(elasticity = .30) 
R2  .367 
Notes:  All  regressions  include  a constant  term  Ordinary  and  White  heteroskedasticity  corrected  standard  errors  in 
.202  .455  .217 






parentheses. Table  B.2 
Growth  and  Government  Capital 
OLS  Regressions  with  Tie  Effect 
(elasticity=  .30) 
f  .484  .264  .482  .26 1 
(.054,  .054)  (.068,  MA)  (.054,  .053)  (.068,  .065) 
Y  -.026  -.026 
(.006,  .006)  (X06,  .006) 
u  < .OOl  <  .OOl 
(ml,  <  .OOl>  (.OOl,  <  ,001) 
d70s  -.008  -.007  -.007  -.006 
(.002,  .002)  (ml,  .002)  (.002,  .002)  (.002,  .002) 
RZ  ,489  .582  .485  .580 
SER  7.701  6.970  7.729  6.983 
(x10-‘) 
LL  332.480  342.578  332.646  342.916 
Notes:  See  Table  B. 1. Do States  Optimize?  Public  Capital  and  Economic  Growth 
The  transformed  public  capital  ratio  remains  as a positive  and  statistically  significant  explanatory 
factor  for  growth,  and  the  results  indicate  important  convergence  effects.  The  role  of  the 
unemployment  rate  is  attenuated,  and  the  time  effect  is  significantly  negative.  Once  again, 
comparing  the  results  contained  in Tables  A.2  and  B.2  yields  no  clear  preference  for  the  linear  or 
non-linear  versions  of the  relationship  between  public  capital  and  growth. 
Just  as with  Table  A-3, Table  B.3  allows  for individual  state  effects--yet  with  dramatically  different 
results.  The  introduction  of  separate  state  effects  in  Table  A.3  did  not  change,  in  any  marked 
fashion,  the  coefficient  estimates  on  the  public  capital  ratio  but  did  raise  the  standard  errors  of  the 
coefficient  estimates  and  left  no  statistically  significant  role  for  public  capital.  The  addition  of 
individual  state  effects  in  Table  B.3,  however,  not  only  leaves  a statistically  significant  role  for 
public  capital  but  raises  the  coefficient  estimates  from  Tables  B.l  and  B.2  by  a factor  of  2 to  3-- 
comparing  the  estimates  in the  last column  of each  of these  tables,  f?om  0.2 17 (Table  B. 1) and  0.261 
(Table  B.2)  to  1.220  (Table  B.3).  Further,  the  results  of  Table  B.3  provide  little  support  for  a 
significant  convergence  effect  across  states  economies;  the coefficient  estimates  on the  initial  output 
per worker  variable  carry  the  appropriate  sign  and magnitude,  but  are not  significantly  different  from 
zero  at conventional  levels.  Finally,  the  explanatory  power  of the  regression--as  measured  by  the 
adjusted  coefficient  of  determination--is  considerably  higher  for  the  equations  contained  in Table 
B.3  than  for  the  analogous  equations  in Table  A.3,  in the  range  of  61 to  62 percent  (Table  B.3)  as 
opposed  to  40  to  41  percent  (TabIe  A.3).  Consequently,  a rather  strong  justification  exists  for  a 
preference  for  the  non-linear  over  the  linear  version  of the  relationship  between  public  capital  and 
18 Table  B.3 
Growth  and  Government  Capital 
Fired  Effect  Regressions 
(elasticity=  .30) 
d70s  -.Oll  -.Oll 
(.002,  .002)  (.002,  .002) 
R'  .616  .617 
SER  6.680  6.669 
(xlo-3) 
LL 
Notes:  See  Table  B. 1. 
< .OOl  .OOl 
(ml,  .OOl)  (.OOl, .OOl) 
-.OlO  -.009 
(.002,.003)  (.003,.003) 
6.744  6.679 
380.062  382.072 Do States  Optimize?  Public  Capital  and  Economic  Growth 
growth. 
Table  8.4  contains  estimation  results  for various  parameterizations  off;  where  the  output  elasticity 
of public  capital  equals  0.20,0.25,0.30,  and  0.35, respectively.  Each  of these  equations  in the  table 
also  contains  (but  does  not  report  coefftcient  estimates  for)  a constant  term,  the  initial  level  of the 
logarithm  of  output  per  worker,  the  initial  unemployment  rate,  and  a separate  time  effect  for  the 
1970s. ’  ’  Of  these  values  for  the  output  elasticity  of  public  capital,  the  log  likelihood  function  is 
maximized  for  the  previously  assumed  value  of  0.30.  Values  for  the  output  elasticity  of  public 
capital  either  lower  or higher  than  0.30  yield  lower  (and  often  markedly  less  significant)  coefficient 
estimates  for  the  impact  of public  capital  on  growth.  Figure  3 extends  the  results  of Table  B.4  by 
illustrating  the  values  of the  log  likelihood  function  for output  elasticities  of public  capital  ranging 
in  intervals  of  0.01  from  0.18  up  to  0.60;  as the  figure  shows,  the  ascent  and  descent  of  the  log 
likelihood  values  is quite  steep  around  the  maximizing  value  of 0.30. 
Figure  4  illustrates  the  relationship  between&he  transformed  public  capital  ratio  assuming  an 
output  elasticity  of public  capital  equal  to 0.30~-and  the  actual  values  for  the  public  capital  ratio  in 
the  sample.  The  graph  of this  relationship  peaks  at 
a  _  ak  =  m3  max  -  = 0.612 
(I  -akg)2  (o.7)2 
(24) 
which  suggests  that  for most  of the  sample--specifically,  for 87 of 96 observations--the  actual  public 
19 Table  B.4 
Growth  and  Government  Capital 
Fixed  Effect  Regressions 
(Varying  elasticity) 
elasticity  .20  .25  .30  .35 
f  .284  1.040  1.220  .821 
(.253,  .267)  (.297,  .349)  (.237.  .266)  (. 179,  ,204) 
RZ  .40 1  .519  .616  .583 
SER  8.339  7.746  6.679  6.955 
(x10.‘) 
LL  360.767  371.250  382.072  378.184 

















































Figure  4 
Deficient  Public  Capital? 
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capital  ratio  falls  below  the  growth  maximizing  value  of the  public  capital  ratio  of  0.612.  In  this 
sense  it  can  be  said  that  the  government  capital  stock  is  deficient;  for  these  87  observations  an 
increase  in the  public  capital  ratio  would  have  increased  the  economic  growth  rate. 
The  precise  magnitude  of the  effect  of a change  in the public  capital  ratio  on growth  can be obtained 
by  differentiating  equation  (13)  and  can  be shown  to be  given  by 
(25) 
Consequently,  for  b =  1.220  and  akg  = 0.3,  a one  standard  deviation  increase  in the  public  capital 
ratio  from  its sample  average  value  of 0.446  induces  a 1.25 standard  deviation  increase  in the  growth 
rate  of  output  per  worker,  equal  to  0.014  percent  per  year.  This  is  a fairly  sizeable  impact  and 
suggests  that  for  many  states  an  insufficient  level  of  investment  in public  capital  may  have  been 
responsible  for  relatively  sluggish  productivity  growth  in recent  decades. 
C. Public  Capital,  Government  Spending,  and  Economic  Growth 
In recent  empirical  work,  a number  of authors  have  found  that  economic  growth  rates  are adversely 
affected  by higher  levels  of government  spending.  For  example,  using  cross-country  data  over  the 
period  1960  to  1985  Barre  (1991)  and  Barro  and  &la-i-Martin  (1995)  find  that  a  6.5 percentage 
point  rise  in government  consumption  spending--defined  as total  government  consumption  spending 







Table  C.l 
Growth,  Government  Capital,  and  Government  Spending 
Fixed  Effect  Regressions 
(public  capital  elasticity  = .33, government  spending  elasticity  = .OS) 
1.019  1.001  1.019 
(.182,  .225)  (.180,  .211)  (. 184,  .229) 
..354  .390  ..352 
(.120,  .121)  (.121,  .125)  (.121,  .125) 
-.029 
(.020,  ,015) 
<  .OOl 
(.OOl, .OOl) 
-.012  -.012  -.Oll 
(.002,  .002)  (.002,  ,002)  (.002,  .003) 
.666  .674  .659 
.993 
(.181,  .212) 
.394 
(.121,  .129) 
-.039 




(.003,  ,003) 
.673 
SER  6.224  6.155  6.295  6.160 
(x10“) 
LL  387.695  389.9  11  387.75  1  390.947 
lotes:  All regressions  also  contain  a constant  term.  Ordinary  and  White  heteroskedasticity  corrected  standard  errors 
in  parentheses. DO States  Optimize?  Public  Capital  and  Economic  Growth 
rate  of 0.7 percent  per  year.  This  suggests  that  such  spending  is either  unproductive  by  nature  or, 
if productive,  has  been  taken  well  beyond  its growth  maximizing  level. 
To  investigate  the  impact  of  flow  government  expenditures  on  economic  growth  in  the  present 
context,  we  postulate  the  regression  equation 
y,,  =  a  + bkgsfkg  If  +  bgsfg ,t  +  I;‘z.  +  ‘it  rt 
where  transformed  government  capital  (as before)  is given  by 
f kgg.rt = 
1 +  (1 - ‘kg>@it 
transformed  government  spending  is expressed  as 
(26) 
(27) 
and  & denotes  the  ratio  of  government  spending  to private  capital.  We  note  that  the  difference  in 
form  between  the transformed  government  capital  and government  spending  variables  arises  because  ’ 
the  former  involves  the  stock  of  government  capital  whereas  the  latter  involves  the  jlow  of 
government  spending. 
Table  C. 1 shows  the  results  of  fixed  effects  regressions  of equation  (26)  under  the  assumption  that 
the  output  elasticities  of  public  capital  and  government  spending  are  equal  to  0.33  and  0.05, 
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respectively.  Regardless  of the  inclusion  or exclusion  of one  or both  of the  initial  output  per  worker 
or unemployment  variables,  each  of the  transformed  public  sector  variablesf&  and&  is significantly 
associated  with  output  growth.  As  with  the  results  in  the  previous  section,  these  fixed  effects 
regressions  allow  little  explanatory  power  for the  initial  level  of output  per  worker,  casting  further 
doubt  on  the  existence  of strong  convergence  effects  across  state  economies.  Furthermore,  the  lack 
of a significant  effect  for the  initial  output  variable  implies  that  a permanent  increase  in either  of the 
transformed  governmental  variablesfl,  orfg  may  well  have  a permanent,  rather  than  a temporary, 
positive  effect  on  economic  growth--a  result  in agreement  with  Kocherlakota  and  Yi (1996). 
Table  C.2  and Figures  5 and  6 indicate  the  effects  of varying  the output  elasticities  of public  capital 
and government  spending  away  from  the assumed  values  of 0.33 and 0.05, respectively.  As the table 
indicates,  values  of the  output  elasticites  smaller  or larger  than  0.35  and  0.02,  respectively,  produce 
poorer  estimation  results  (as  measured  by  the  log  likelihood  value  or  the  adjusted  coefficient  of 
determination).  Figure  5 shows  the  partial  effect  of varying  the  output  elasticity  of public  capital 
(conditional  on  an output  elasticity  of government  spending  equal  to  0.05)  on  the  values  of the  log 
likelihood  of the regression;  consistent  with  the results  in Table  C. 1, the  log  likelihood  fLnction  takes 
on  its  maximum  value  when  the  output  elasticity  of public  capital  equals  0.33.  In  turn,  Figure  6 
shows  the partial  effect  of varying  the  output  elasticity  of government  spending  (conditional  on  an 
output  elasticity  of public  capital  equal  to 0.33)  on  the  log  likelihood  value;  again,  consistent  with 
the  previous  results,  the  log  likelihood  is  maximized  when  the  output  elasticity  of  government 
spending  equals  0.05.  Note,  however,  that  the  log  likelihood  function  is much  more  sharply  peaked 
22 elasticity  .oo  .02  .04  .06 
.893  .893  .895  .899 
(.305,  ,338)  (.304,  .335)  (.303,  .333)  (.302,  .33) 
.203  .234  .269  .309 
.25  (.125,  .129)  (.141,  .147)  (.160,  ,167)  (.183,  ,190) 
.536  .537  ,538  .538 
7.334  7.333  7.327  7.322 
374.136  374.213  374.286  374.348 
1.171  1.172  1.172  1.174 
(.223,  .242)  (.223,  .241)  (223,  239)  (.223,  .238) 
.268  .305  .348  .398 
.30  (.102,  .103)  (.116,  .118)  (.132,  .136)  (.151,  ,157) 
.661  ,661  .662  ,662 
6.275  6.270  6.266  6.267 
389.167  389.249  389.297  389.290 
.863  .862  .861  .859 
(.160,  .192)  (.160,  .191)  (.160,  .190)  (.161,  ,189) 
.353  .400  .455  .515 
.35  (.lOl,  .109)  (.115,  .125)  (.131,  .144)  (. 150,  .168) 
.668  .668  .667  .666 
6.210  6.210  6.215  6.228 
390.165  390.167  390.086  389.883 
.611  .609  .607  .604 
(.124,  .148)  (.124,  .147)  (.125,  .147)  (.125,  .146) 
.394  .447  .506  .572 
.40  (.106,  .117)  (.120,  ,135)  (.137,  .156)  (.157,  .182) 
643  .643  ,642  .639 
6.435  6.439  6.448  6.470 
385.745  386.693  386.537  386.233 
rote: In  ea  I cell,  the 1  St  entry  represents  the  ect  of transformed  government  capital  on  growth,  the  second  entry  the 
effect  of transformed  government  spending  on growth,  the third  entry  the adjusted  coefficient  of determination,  the fourth 
entry  the  standard  error  of the  regression  (x103), and  the  fifth  entry  the  log  likelihood  value. 
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Table  C.2 
Growth,  Government  Capital,  and  Government  Spending 
Fixed  Effect  Regressions 
(Varying  elasticities) Figure  5 
Log  Likelihood  Values:  Varying  kg/k 











Figure  6 
Log  Likelihood  Values:  Varying  g/k 
(conditional  on  kg/k) 
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in  Figure  5  than  in  Figure  6, so that  we  may  have  more  confidence  in the  precision  of the  estimate 
of the  output  elasticity  of public  capital  than  of the  output  elasticity  of government  spending. 
Figures  7 and  8 illustrate  the  relationship  between  the transformed  and  actual  ratios  of public  capital 
and  government  spending,  respectively,  to private  capital.  Figure  7 is based  on  an  assumed  value 
of the  output  elasticity  of public  capital  of 0.33  and  indicates  that  for 92 of 96 observations  the  level 
of government  capital  lies  below  the  growth  maximizing  level  given  by 
=  0.735  (29) 
so that--at  least  in this  sense--the  public  capital  stock  once  again  may  be  seen  as deficient.  Figure 
8 is generated  using  an assumed  value  of the output  elasticity  of government  spending  equal  to 0.05 
and  reveals  that  all  96  observations 
maximizing  level  determined  by” 
1 
on  the  ratio  of  government  spending  rest  above  the  growth 
max 
% 
=  ag L  -ag  =  9.043  (30) 
so that--again,  from  the limited  perspective  of maximizing  growth--the  level  of government  spending 
may  be  seen  as excessive. 
The  effects  on  economic  growth  of  increases  in  public  capital  and  government  spending, 
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above)  as 
dyldc$,  =  0.224  (31) 
and 
dyld$  =  -0.266.  (32) 
Accordingly,  a one  standard  deviation  increase  in the  public  capital  ratio  from  its  mean  value  of 
0.446  can be expected  to raise economic  growth  in an amount  equal  to 0.030  percentage  points  per 
year  (or some  2.727  standard  deviations  of output  growth),  while  a one  standard  deviation  increase 
in the  government  spending  ratio  fi-om its mean  value  of 0.139  can  be predicted  to  lower economic 
growth  by an amount  equal  to 0.0 13 percentage  points  per annum  (or some  1.185 standard  deviations 
of output  growth). 
D. Core  Public  Capital,  Other  Public  Capital,  and  Economic  Growth 
This section  allows  a distinction  between  what  has  been  termed  core  public  capital  and  other  types 
of public  capital.  Here,  core  public  capital  is defined  as the  composite  of  streets  and  highways,  and 
water  and  sewer  systems,  while  other  public  capital  (as  a residual  measure)  includes  educational 
buildings,  offke  buildings,  and  conservation  and  development  structures.  In  the  literature  (e.g., 
Aschauer  (1989)  and  Munnell(l990b))  core  public  capital  has  been  found  to have  a larger  estimated 
output  elasticity  than  other  types  of public  capital. 
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Accordingly,  the  final  set  of regressions  are of the  form 
y,,  =  a  +  b  f  kg(corc)  kgg(core),1t 
+b  If  kg(tg(orher) kg(orhcr),rt  +  b  -f  +c*z  +& 
g  g.it  -  -it  It  (33)  . 
wherefi~core,p  fkfotier19  andf,  represent  transformed  ratios  of core  public  capital,  other  public  capital, 
and  government  spending  to private  capital,  respectively.  Here,  the  transformed  ratios  of core  and 
other  public  capital  are given  as 
(34) 
where  x  =  core  and  other,  respectively,  and  the  transformed  ratio  of  government  spending  is 
measured  asI 
(35) 
Table  D.l  presents  estimates  of  the  impact  of  transformed  core  and  other  public  capital  and 
government  spending  on  growth  in  per  worker  output  under  the  assumption  that  the  output 
elasticities  of core  public  capital,  other  public  capital,  and  government  spending  equal  0.25,  0.20, 
and  0.05,  respectively.  All  of the  government  policy  variables  are significantly  related  to economic 
growth,  with  the  largest  quantitative  effects  for  core  public  capital,  then  other  public  capital  and, 
finally,  govemment  spending.  In absolute  value,  the  estimated  coefficient  on  the  initial  level  of per 
capita  output  is quantitatively  (now  in the range  of 0.008  to 0.0 17) and  statistically  minor,  indicating 
weak  or even  nonexistent  convergence  effects. 
25 Table  D. 1 
Growth,  Government  Capital,  and  Government  Spending 
Fixed  Effect  Regressions 
(core  elasticity  = 25,  other  elasticity  = .20, government  spending  elasticity  = .05) 
LL  389.372  389.515  390.063  390.63  1 
iotes:  All  regressions  also  contain  a constant  term.  Oridinary  and  White  heteroskedasticity  corrected  standard  errors 
f tg(mrcJ  .764  .772  .726  .728 
(.213,  .233)  (.216,  .243)  (.219,  .243)  (.220,  .252) 
f  k.@rhcrJ  .651  .662  .700  .655 
(.191,  .176)  (.209,  .200)  (.201.  .196)  (.212,  .206) 
A  .452  .458  ..454  .467 
(.138,  .144)  (.14L,  .147)  (.139,  .149)  (.141,  ,152) 
Y  -.008  -.017 
(.022  ( .014)  (.024,  .016) 
U  .oo  1  ,001 
(.OOl,  ml)  (.OOl,  ,001) 
d70s  -.012  -.012  -.OlO  -.OlO 
(.002,  .003)  (.002,  .003)  (.003,  .004)  (.003,  .004) 
R?  .670  .663  .667  .663 
SER  6.190  6.252  6.217  6.253 
(x10’) 
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Tables  D.2 through  D.4  allow  for different  assumed  values  for the  output  elasticities  of  core  public 
capital  (ranging  from  0.20  to 0.30),  other  public  capital  (ranging  from  0.15  to 0.25),  and government 
spending  (ranging  from  0.04  to 0.06).  As the tables  indicate,  a departure  of  either  of the  two  public 
capital  elasticities  from  the values  assumed  in Table  D. l--O.25 and 0.20,  respectively--causes  a rather 
significant  deterioration  in  the  fit  of  the  regressions  (as  measured  by  the  adjusted  coefficients  of 
determination  or the  log  likelihood  values)  and tends  to reduce  the  statistical  significance  of one  or 
both  of the transformed  public  capital  variables.  On the  other  hand,  assuming  different  values  for 
the  output  elasticity  of  government  spending  has  little  impact  on  the  explanatory  power  of  the 
regressions  or on  the  magnitudes  or statistical  significance  of the  government  policy  variables. 
Figures  9,  10, and  11 show  the  relationships  between  transformed  and  actual  ratios  of core  public 
capital,  other  public  capital,  and  government  spending,  respectively,  assuming  the output  elasticities 
contained  in Table  D. 1.  These  elasticity  values  imply  growth-maximizing  values  of  core  public 
capital,  other  public  capital,  and  government  spending  of 0.444,0.3  13, and  0.043,  respectively,  to 
be compared  with  actual  sample  average  values  of 0.267,0.179,  and  0.139.  Figures  9 and  10 then 
indicate  that  there  has  been  a deficient  level  of public  capital  accumulation--from  the  perspective  of 
economic  growth--for  94 of the  96 observations  (for core  capital)  and  90 of the  96 observations  (for 
other  capital);  Figure  11 shows  that  there  has been  an excessive  level  of  government  spending  for 
94 of 96 total  observations. 
The  corresponding  effects  of  changes  in these  governmental  variables  on  growth  can  be  shown  to 
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Growth,  Core  Government  Capital,  and  Other  Government  Capital 
Fixed  Effect  Regressions 
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.736 
(.215,  ,214) 
.25 
.813 
(.271,  .233) 
.482 
(.139,  .141) 
.288  ,410  .470 
(.185,  ,165)  (.138,  ,145)  (.140,  .151) 
.567  .640  .642 
7.093  6.465  6.446 
378.533  387.425  387.708 
.850  .727  .739 
(.227,  .270)  (.220,  .252)  (.222,  ,252) 
.648  .656  .410 
(.333,  .367)  (.212,  .207)  (.141,  .134) 
.316  -438  .489 
(.145,  .148)  (.132,  .141)  (.137,  .152) 
.621  -663  .656 
6.635  6.253  6.319 
384.946  390.637  389.622 
.650  .526  .523 
(.170,  .227)  (.171  .222)  (. 176,  .226) 
.756  ,661  .401 
(.328,  .34 1)  (.216,  ,206)  (.146,  ,137) 
.333 
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rote: in each  cell,  the first  entry  represents  the effect  of transformed  government  core  capual  on  growth,  the second  entry 
the  effect  of transfortned  government  other  capital,  the  third  entry  the effect  of  transformed  government  spending  on 
growth,  the  fourth  entry  the  adjusted  coefficient  of determination,  the  fifth  entry  the  standard  error  of  the  regression 
(xl@),  and  the  sixth  entry  the  log  likelihood  value. l_ 
N 
.354  ,493  .546 
(.154, .157)  (. 143, ,159)  (.149, ,172) 
.624  .653  .640 
6.610  6.343  6.46  1 
385.304  389.261  387.487 
. 
ect of transtormed  government  core  capital  on growth,  the second  entry  ‘ate: in each  cell,  the  1  t entry  represents  the 
the  effect  of transformed  government  other  capital,  the  third  entry  the effect  of transformed  government  spending  on 
growth,  the  fourth  entry  the  adjusted  coefficient  of determination,  the  fifth  entry  the  standard  error  of  the  regression 
(x103), and  the  sixth  entry  the  log  likelihood  value. 
Table  D.3 
Growth,  Core  Government  Capital, and Other  Government  Capital 
Fixed Effect  Regressions 














(.275,  ,238) 
,735 
(214,  ,213) 
.25 
.818 
(.271,  ,230) 
.482 
(.139,  .140) 
.310  .439 
(.165, .177)  (. 147, ,155) 
.567  .640 
7.089  6.460 
378.586  387.507 
.851  .728 
(.222, .270)  (.220,  .252) 
647  .655 







(.222, .25  1) 
.409 
(.141, .134) 
.338  .467  .523 
(.155, .158)  (.141,  .152)  (.146, .163) 
.621  .663  .656 
6.635  6.253  6.319 
384.943  390.63 1  389.629 
.649  .526  .522 
(.171, ,227)  (.171  ,222)  (. 176,  .225) 
.756  .661  .400 
(.328, .341)  (.216,  .205)  (.146, .137) Table  DA 
Growth,  Core  Government  Capital,  and  Other  Government  Capital 
Fixed Effect  Regressions 














(275,  ,236) 
.733 
(.21-t,  .‘I  I) 
-25 
.825 
(.270,  .228) 
.482 
(.138,  .140) 
.333  .47 1  .540 
(.177, .189)  (.157,  .161)  (.160,  .174) 
.568  ,641  .644 
7.086  6.456  6.432 
378.634  337.573  387.926 
.852  -730  .742 
(227,  .270)  (_220,.251)  (.222,  .250) 
.646  654  .409 
(.333, .367)  (-212,  .205)  (.141,  .133) 
.361  .499  .558 
(.165, .169)  1.151,  .164)  (.156,  .177) 
.621  ,663  .656 
6.636  6.255  6.321 
384.926  390.5%  389.601 
.649  .525  .521 
(.171, .226j  (.171  ,221)  (.177,  .224) 
.756  .660  .400 
(.328, ,341)  (.216,  ,204)  (.146,  .137) 
.376  .524  .581 
(.165, .169)  c.153,  ,172)  (.159,  .186) 
.623  ,653  .639 
6.616  6.351  6.470 
385.212  389.134  387.362 
. 
Note:  in each  cell,  the  first  entry  represents  the effect  of transformed  government  core  capital  on  growth,  the  second  entry 
the effect of transformed  government  other capital.  the third entry  the effect  of transformed  government  spending  on growth, 
the fourth entry  the adjusted  coefficient  of determination,  the fifth  entry  the standard  error  of the regression  (x103), and  the 
sixth  entry  the log likelihood  value. 0.62  -I- 
0.60 
%  0.58 
0.56 
0.54 
Figure  9 
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Perhaps  surprisingly,  the  economic  growth  effects  of core public  capital  are exceeded  by  the  effects 
of  other  public  capital.  Specifically,  a  one  standard  deviation  increase  in  core  capital  can  be 
expected  to induce  roughly  a one-third  standard  deviation  increase  in output  growth  (equal  to 0.003 
percent  per  year)  while  a one  standard  deviation  increase  in other  capital  can  be predicted  to bring 
forth  approximately  a one-half  standard  deviation  increase  in  economic  growth  (equal  to  0.005 
percent  per  year).  As  in  the  previous  section,  however,  a  one  standard  deviation  increase  in 
government  spending  is  associated  with  more  than  a one  standard  deviation  decrease  in  output 
growth  (equal  to 0.015  percent  per  year). 
IV.  Conclusions  and  Directions  for  Further  Research 
The  results  of this paper  indicate  that  for most  of the  United  States  during  the  1970s  and  1980s  the 
actual  levels  of  public  capital  were  below  the  levels  which  would  have  maximized  the  rate  of 
productivity  growth.  Specifically,  the  growth  maximizing  ratio  of public  capital  to private  capital 
is estimated  to equal  0.444  for core  public  capital  and 0.3 13 for other  public  capital,  while  the  actual 
sample  averages  equal  the  smaller  values  of  0.267  and  0.179,  respectively.  Thus,  the  empirical 
27 DO States  Optimize?  Public  Capital  and  Economic  Growth 
results  suggest  that  a one  standard  deviation  increase  in either  core  or  other  public  capital  would 
stimulate  a one-third  to  one-half  standard  deviation  increase  in output  growth  per  worker. 
At  the  same  time,  the  results  suggest  that  for  nearly  ail  states  the  actual  levels  of  government 
spending  were  above  the  levels  that  would  maximize  productivity  growth.  While  the  growth 
maximizing  ratio  of government  spending  to private  capital  is estimated  to equal  0.043,  the  sample 
average  ratio  equals  a  much  larger  0.139.  Consequently,  a one  standard  deviation  increase  in 
government  spending  is estimated  to induce  somewhat  more  than  a  one  standard  deviation  decrease 
in the  rate  of  economic  growth. 
Statistically  (though  not  necessarily  quantiatively)  the  empirical  results  of this  paper  also  indicate 
a lack  of  convergence  effects  across  state  economies.  From  a policy  perspective,  this  implies  that 
permanent  changes  in government  policy  variables--such  as a permanent  increase  in public  capital 
or  a  permanent  decrease  in  government  consumption  spending--are  consistent  with  permanent 
changes  in economic  growth  rates.  This  result  is compatible  with  some  recent  empirical  work,  such 
as Kocherlakota  and  Yi (1996),  but  stands  in stark  contrast  with  other  work,  such  as Barro  and  Sala- 
I-Martin  (1995).  In subsequent  research,  therefore,  it would  be of  some  value  to  further  investigate 
the  role  of convergence  effects  in order  to obtain  a more  accurate  assessment  of the  impact  of public 
capital  and  spending  levels  on  economic  growth  rates. 
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Endnotes 
1.  Nor  is it a necessary  condition.  See,  for  example,  Flores  de Frutos  and  Periera  (1992). 
2. On  the  transition  path  between  steady  states  we  have 
where  yv = growth  rate of output  per  worker,  kg =  public  capital,  k = private  capital,  mp,  = marginal 
product  of  input  x (X = kg,  k), y  = output  per  worker,  and  dots  denote  time  derivatives. 
3.  The  approach  expands  on  the  model  in Barro  (1990)  by  focusing  on  the  productive  services  of 
public  capitaZ rather  than  of  flow  government  spending.  Although  fairly  subtle,  the  distinction  is 
important  from  theoretical  and  policy  perspectives.  For  instance,  some  researchers  have  drawn  the 
(incorrect)  conclusion  Corn  Barro’s  model  that  the  “condition  for productive  efficiency  is that  the 
share  of  government  capital  in  output  is equal  to  its elasticity”  and  have  performed  “back-of-the- 
envelope”  calculations  to show  that  the  U.S.  has  grossly  underinvested  in government  capital  (Ho 
and  Sorenson  (1993)). 
4. It is straightforward  to  extend  the  analysis  using  a constant  elasticity  of  substitution  production 
function. 
5.  In  this  expression,  the  tax  rate,  8,  can  be  viewed  as  consisting  of  two  components.  The 
government  needs  to service  the  initial  stock  of debt  at the  interest  rate  r, but  due  to output  growth 
and  a rising  tax  base  the  required  tax  rate  would  be given  by 
In addition,  the  government  must  finance  on-going  public  investment  at rate  y to maintain  the public 
capital  ratio,  necessitating  a tax  rate  of 
The  overall  tax  rate  is then  given  by 
8  =  8,  + 0,;: = 
(r - Wg,  y-kg,  r-  kg0 
f-Z- 
0  yo  yo  yo 
which  is consistent  with  equation  (6) in the  text. 
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